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4856 and 4857: two separate votes
Both proposals were in voting at the 17 November 2026, 15:42 UTC check. Vote on 4856 or vote on 4857. Voting closes on 24 November at 14:24 UTC and 14:25 UTC respectively.
4856 (Proposal 1) seeks 0xPhilipp’s removal and a controlled transition. 4857 (Proposal 2) establishes community governance and independent accountability and can operate with the existing Board if Proposal 1 fails. These are submitted proposals. Each requires its own passage and lawful adoption under the existing governing documents.
Three approvals through the transition
All directors must approve until a fourth director is appointed, after which three approvals are required. Proposal 1 therefore requires 3-of-3, then 3-of-4 and 3-of-5. It removes the earlier temporary 2-of-3 permission. Recusal, abstention or an old proposal snapshot must not reduce the affirmative-approval minimum. Proposal 2 grants no two-approval permission.
The ongoing 4855 election continues; the replacement seat has a separate election. If removal leaves four directors, three approvals are required. Discretionary interim authority expires 60 calendar days after activation or when the fourth joins, whichever is earlier. Limited caretaker acts after day 60 still require all three remaining directors; expiry does not relax the approval rule.
Implementation and independent review
Each proposal calls for acknowledgement and named implementers within seven calendar days of passage, an implementation dossier within 21 calendar days of passage, weekly progress and prompt disclosure of material obstacles. Late acknowledgement does not restart the 21-day clock. The dossier must identify legal authority, required approvals, funding, independent appointments, contract-control records and a dated remedy for every missing item.
Proposal 2’s independent financial and authority review covers Foundation-controlled funds and powers and relevant TLA commitments from 12 August 2024 through passage, with bounded earlier and later records where needed. It examines relevant decisions by every director, reconciles paid and conditional amounts without double counting, and tests milestone acceptance and privileged operations. Subjects may respond but cannot control reviewer selection, findings, publication or fees.
Preliminary findings are due within 30 calendar days and a final report within 60 calendar days of legal adoption. Affected parties have at least seven calendar days to respond to proposed adverse findings. Missing funding, access or appointments must be disclosed and pursued; a status report is not an independent review. Neither removal nor an evidence gap establishes liability.
Continuing public accountability
- A public decision register, updated within seven calendar days of decisions or material changes, subject to earlier duties.
- Accountability reports every four calendar months from adoption, alongside weekly implementation updates.
- A proposed Board/community approval framework within 60 calendar days of adoption, at least 21 calendar days for public comment, and submission of the exact framework to Terra Governance within 90 calendar days of adoption.
The framework must consider related financial exposure, purpose, risk, conflicts and control. Preparing it grants no new spending power. Conflict rules prohibit beneficiaries from approving their own project budgets, milestone acceptance or payment releases; an approval impasse needs a lawful remedy, not fewer signatures.
Verify handover and operating readiness
Both proposals preserve the original administration-after-one-month and ownership-after-three-month commitments. The 21-day dossier must cover direct and indirect privileged control, TLA global configuration, Foundation-used Treasury/v3 contracts, source/build/licence and maintenance access, independent operating checks and a costed contingency plan. Completed transfers receive credit; unresolved scope and access remain identified as such. These requirements do not establish current ownership or prove a failure before the evidence is reviewed.
Community passage, legal adoption and contract execution remain distinct. Required legal and technical safeguards continue. Specific obstacles require assessment and a lawful remedy while unaffected work proceeds. Neither proposal authorizes unspecified expenditure, automatic asset recovery, an automatic shutdown or a transfer of unrelated ERIS property.
Board approval rules
The four-seat board requires three YES votes. That means any three can approve an action over the fourth seat’s objection or absence. A159, A249 and A271 show why beneficiary disclosure and recusal matter across the whole board.
A272 proposed removing Vini and reducing the threshold to 60%. It failed: 0xPhilipp and MB voted YES, Rose voted NO and Vini was absent. The current captured board remains four seats at 75%. Sequence alone does not establish motive.
The Think Tank cast no YES or NO votes on four veto proposals
Four substantive veto proposals had zero YES and zero NO ballots. Only limited abstentions were recorded. The technical member proposed all five and abstained on all five. P5’s empty message means the proposed veto could not execute even if approved.
The records leave two problems to resolve: missing votes and an empty veto message. Membership history, notifications and proposal construction need checking; the reasons for non-participation are unknown.
“Update admin” is not the same as “transfer ownership”
The board received upgrade control over two contracts on 25 October 2026. The historical captures below record unchanged internal settings. The 16 November review checks those roles again and records the subsequent A292 upgrade.
Scroll sideways to read all columns.
| Contract / role | After ERIS proposal 9 | Still retained elsewhere |
|---|---|---|
| ampLUNA hub CosmWasm admin | Phoenix board terra1k8ug…lppjg | — |
ampLUNA hub config.owner | Unchanged | terra1kefa…klgzl; new_owner: null |
| CW20-ICS20 CosmWasm admin | Phoenix board terra1k8ug…lppjg | — |
CW20-ICS20 gov_contract | Unchanged | terra1q0v…tew |
| Treasury and TLA registry migration admin | Not changed by proposal 9 | terra1q0v…tew |
| TLA registry configuration owner | Not changed by proposal 9 | terra1kefa…klgzl; no pending owner |
Proposal 9 contains exactly two wasm.update_admin messages. Calling it “Transfer Ownership” is therefore incomplete: it transferred code-upgrade control, not all operational/configuration control.
- Proposal 9 execution transaction
- Current hub internal config
- Current ICS20 internal config
- Download the contract metadata and config captures
Original handover commitments
The 2024 TLA launch text says registry ownership transfers after three months and contract admin after one month. The packaged ledger identifies 31 privileged operations in 19 transactions after its conservative cutoff, affecting seven original contracts. The original commitment and roles were independently checked at the October capture; every historical ledger operation was not replayed in this review.
Successful transactions prove use of an address’s authority, not exclusive human key custody. No approved extension was found in the reviewed records; an agreement elsewhere remains possible.
Ceres removal and redelegation
Ceres removed from the hub whitelist
The published ERIS configuration address executed the removal.
Rebalance 40 seconds later
Seven redelegations totalled 1,680,127.496132 LUNA, including 662,828.893153 LUNA away from Ceres.
Compare the eligibility criteria, whitelist, gauge outputs and public rationale immediately before and after the change. These hub staking redelegations are distinct from Phoenix Alliance allocations. Timing alone does not establish retaliation, favoritism or coordinated voting.
Other retained permissions
The 27 October queries show the published ERIS configuration address as hub and prop-gauge owner, while the hub’s raw vote operator points to the prop-gauge. Creda’s registry identifies the protocol fee account as reserve controller; the Portfolio’s migration administrator is a separate role.
The successful FEE_COLLECTOR assignment, Treasury configuration-role assignment and arbLUNA collateral addition also document uses of retained authority. These records show assigned permissions and asset movements; they do not establish personal profit. Two Creda reserve collections included 5,701.254836 and 2,679.750683 LUNA, alongside other assets that remain separately denominated.
These current responses do not establish the requested historical snapshots: providers did not return headers confirming those heights. Match permissions to deployed code before asserting every supported capability, and do not infer exclusive personal key custody from a public role label.
Why ERIS says it made source code private
ERIS’s retrospective says appropriate contracts were moved to private source for security. That is ERIS’s explanation for the missing public source.
The stated rationale does not independently establish stronger security or audit coverage for every deployed 2026 revision. Public audit reports exist; independent review still needs the auditor, scope, source commit, deployed checksum, outstanding findings and remediation.
Longer-term reforms
Disclose and recuse
Maintain a current stakeholder register covering grants, compensation, OTC, hosting, delegations and voting power. Require recusal and independent approval for related-party decisions, with the rationale published.
Make veto proposals usable
Give the Think Tank reliable notifications, complete executable messages, adequate voting windows and published rationales. Publish participation records and investigate failed veto proposals.
Separate technical powers
Document migration admin, internal owner, treasury control and vote operator separately. Use explicit acceptance for ownership transfers, independent verification and runbooks for emergency action.
Publish voting instructions and results
Publish hub/gauge intentions and final ballots, validator-mandate rules and material voting-power holders at entity level. Preserve weighted dissent and avoid interpreting delegation as ownership.
Record each payment’s approval and acceptance
Keep the budget, recipient, declared conflicts, promised work, acceptance, entitlement, claim and valuation together. Independently reconcile recurring expenses and related-party OTC execution.
Review and respond
Commission periodic independent control review with access to off-chain agreements. Give affected stakeholders a right of response and publish corrections against specific evidence.
TLA and Treasury: funding to manage community assets
The 16 November control review compares the terms for chain liquidity and Treasury infrastructure with delivered safeguards, retained authority and outstanding handovers. Application-development grants are a separate category; their funding does not itself require transfer of the builder’s IP or establish a TLA-style handover obligation.